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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(4) (2002), transferred this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals.
Consequently,

the

Utah

Court

of

Appeals

is

conferred

with

jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2) (j) (2002) .

STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether trial counsel denied Mr. Terry of the Sixth

Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel by failing
to request jury instructions on the lesser included offenses of
possession of controlled substance precursors and attempt.

To

make such a showing, a defendant must show, first, that counsel
rendered

a deficient

performance, falling below an objective

standard of reasonable professional judgment, and, second, that
counsel's performance was prejudicial.
803 (Utah 1988) .

Bundy

v. DeLand,

The appellate court reviews such a claim as a

matter of law.

State

State

2003 UT App 52, fl2, 65 P. 3d 648, cert,

v.

Smith,

763 P.2d

v. Maestas,

1999 UT 32, 1|20, 984 P.2d 376;
granted,

76 P.3d 691 (Utah 2003) .
Mr. Terry also asserts this issue by way of plain error.
State

v. Dunn,

In

850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court

1

outlined the following principles involved in determining whether
"plain error" exists:
In general, to establish the existence of
plain error and to obtain appellate relief
from an alleged error that was not properly
objected to, the appellant must show the
following:
(i) An error exists; (ii) the
error should have been obvious to the trial
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e.,
absent the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for
the appellant, or phrased differently, our
confidence in the verdict is undermined.
Id.

at 1208-09; see

also

State

1099 (citing State v. Helmick,
Preservation

of Issue

v.

Roth,

2001 UT 103, %5, 37 P.3d

2000 UT 70, %9, 9 P.3d 164).

or Statement

of Grounds

for

Review

Issues involving claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
constitute an exception to the preservation rule inasmuch as such
claims may be raised for the first time on appeal.

This issue is

also being raised for the first time on appeal by way of plain
error, which likewise constitutes an exception to the preservation
rule.
2.

Whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of

counsel and the trial court committed plain error by failing to
accurately instruct the jury concerning the law and elements of
the charges.
defendant

must

To prove
first

ineffective

show

that

assistance

counsel

of counsel, a

rendered

a deficient

performance that fell below an objective standard of reasonable

professional judgment, and, second, that counsel's performance was
prejudicial.

Bundy

v. DeLand,

763 P.2d 803 (Utah 1988).

claim is reviewed as a matter of law.
32, f20, 984 P.2d 376; State
P.3d 648, cert, granted,
In State

v. Dunn,

v.

State

Smith,

v.

Maestas,

Such a
1999 UT

2003 UT App 52, fl2, 65

16 P.3d 691 (Utah 2003) .
850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme

Court outlined the following principles involved in determining
whether "plain error" exists:
In general, to establish the existence of
plain error and to obtain appellate relief
from an alleged error that was not properly
objected to, the appellant must show the
following:
(i) An error exists; (ii) the
error should have been obvious to the trial
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e.,
absent the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for
the appellant, or phrased differently, our
confidence in the verdict is undermined.
Id.

at 1208-09; see

1099 (citing State
Preservation

of Issue

also
v.

State

Helmick,
Citation

v.

Roth,

2001 UT 103, ^5,

37 P.3d

2000 UT 70, %9, 9 P.3d 164).
or Statement

of Grounds

for

Review:

Issues involving claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
and plain error constitute exceptions to the preservation rule and
therefore may be raised for the first time on appeal.

3

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules,
regulations, or case law, whose interpretation is determinative,
are set out verbatim or by copy, with the appropriate citation, in
the

body

and

arguments

or

addenda

of

the

instant

Brief

of

Appellant.
STATEMENT QF THE CASE
This case involves critical questions concerning, among other
critical matters, the failure to request jury instructions on the
lesser included offenses of possession of controlled substance
precursors and an attempt to commit the charged crimes or the
lesser included offenses.

In this case, trial counsel failed to

request jury instructions and the trial court failed to provide
instructions that would have provided a rational basis for the
jury to donvict Defendant of the lesser included offenses.
Defendant

was

charged

with

two

counts

of

Clandestine

Laboratory Precursors and/or Equipment

(Counts 1 and 2 ) , both

first-degree

Failure

felonies,

one

count

of

to

Respond

to

Officer's Signal to Stop (Count 3), a third-degree felony, and one
count of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon (Count 4), a class
B misdemeanor.

Defendant pleaded not guilty to all the charges.

4

On November 13, 2001, the parties appeared for a jury trial.
The jury found Defendant guilty of all charges.
Defense counsel subsequently filed various motions, which the
trial

court

denied.

On September

9,

2002,

the trial

court

sentenced Defendant to an indeterminate term of five years to life
on Counts 1 and 2, an indeterminate term of zero to five years on
Count 3, and six months in the Davis County Jail on Count 4, to be
served concurrently.

Defense counsel filed a Motion for New Trial

On September 23, 2002, to which the State responded in opposition.
The trial court denied the Motion for New Trial on February 25,
2003.
On September 15, 2003, Defendant, acting pro se, filed a Rule
65B Motion for Resentencing, requesting nunc pro tunc resentencing
due to his counsel's failure to perfect an appeal.

The trial

court, on February 24, 2004, granted the Motion and resentenced
Defendant,

imposing

September 9, 2002.

the

same

sentence

previously

imposed

on

Defendant filed a pro se Notice of Appeal on

March 23, 2004.
On May 19, 2 004, the Utah Supreme Court transferred the
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(4).

Pursuant to Defendant's request, the trial court

appointed the undersigned as appellate counsel for purposes of the
appeal.
5

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Mr. Terry was charged with two counts of Clandestine

Laboratory Precursors and/or Equipment

(Counts 1 and 2) , both

first-degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37d-4
and 58-37d-5, one count of Failure to Respond to Officer's Signal
to Stop (Count 3) , a third-degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5, and one count of Carrying a Concealed
Dangerous Weapon (Count 4), a class B misdemeanor, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504(1)

(R. 68-70).

See

Information /

Complaint for Forfeiture, R. 68-70, a true and correct copy of
which is attached hereto as Addendum A.
2.

Mr. Terry pleaded not guilty to all charges (R. 48-49).

3.

The parties appeared for a jury trial on November 13,

2001 (R. 115-19).
4.

After deliberating, the jury found Mr. Terry guilty on

all charges (R. 601:254:13-19).
5.

On April 11, 2002, defense counsel filed a Motion to

Dismiss or for New Trial (R. 171-83).
6.

On

May

8,

2002,

the

State

filed

a

memorandum

in

opposition to Mr. Terry's Motion (R. 188-229).
7.

After taking the matter under advisement, the trial

court ruled, among other things, that the Motion for a new trial
was untimely (R. 242-44) .
6

8.

On June 28, 2002, defense counsel asserted essentially

the same theories previously raised in the form of a Motion for
Arrest of Judgment (R. 2 55-66).
9.

The State again responded in opposition (R. 270-73).

10.

On August 27, 2002, the trial court issued its Ruling on

Defendant's Motion for Arrest of Judgment, denying the Motion for
Arrest of Judgment (R. 2 92-309).
11.

On September 9, 2002, the trial court sentenced Mr.

Terry to an indeterminate term of five years to life on Counts 1
and 2, an indeterminate term of zero to five years on Count 3, and
six months in the Davis County Jail on Count 4, to be served
concurrently (R. 331; R. 347-49).
12.

On September 23, 2002, defense counsel filed a Motion

for New Trial (R. 354-55).
13.

The State responded in opposition (R. 359-404).

14.

On February 25, 2003, the trial court denied the Motion

for New Trial (R. 515-16) .
15.

On

September

15,

2003,

Mr.

Terry,

pro

se,

filed

Defendant's Rule 65B Motion for Resentencing, requesting nunc pro
tunc resentencing due to his counsel's failure to perfect an
appeal (R. 521-34).
16.

The State opposed Mr. Terry's Rule 65B Motion (R. 542-

44) .
7

17.
the Rule

On February 24, 2 004, the trial court held a hearing on
65B Motion for Resentencing

(R. 558) .

During that

hearing, the State agreed to a resentencing to begin the appeal
time running again (R. 559) .
18.

That same day, the trial court resentenced Mr. Terry,

imposing the same sentence previously imposed on September 9, 2002
(R. 560). See Second Amended Judgment and Commitment to the Utah
State Prison, R. 560, a true and correct copy of which is attached
hereto as Addendum B.
19.

On March 23, 2004, Mr. Terry filed a pro se Notice of

Appeal (R. 565-67).

See Notice of Appeal, R. 565-67, a true and

correct copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum C.
20.

On May 19, 2004, the Utah Supreme Court transferred the

appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2 (4) .
21.

Pursuant to the request of Mr. Terry, the trial court

appointed the undersigned as appellate counsel for purposes of the
appeal (R. 591-92).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Trial counsel denied Mr. Terry of the Sixth Amendment

right to the effective assistance of counsel by failing to request
jury instructions on the lesser included offenses of possession of

8

controlled substance precursors, including the attempt to commit
the charged crimes.

In this case, not only is there is a close

relationship between the enhanced crime of clandestine laboratory
precursors and/or equipment and possession of controlled substance
precursors, but there also is significant overlap in the elements
of each offense.
Further, the evidence presented

during

trial provided a

rational basis for the jury to acquit Mr. Terry of the enhanced
crime of clandestine laboratory precursors and/or equipment and
then convict him of a lesser included offense of possession of a
controlled substance precursor had those particular instructions
been given.

The jury could have rationally

found under the

circumstances of this case that Mr. Terry merely possessed, if
that,

the

controlled

substance

precursors

of

iodine

and/or

pseudoephedrine.
Trial counsel also failed to request a jury instruction
concerning the attempt of Mr. Terry to commit the crime of either
the enhanced crime of clandestine laboratory precursors and/or
equipment

and possession

of

controlled

substance precursors.

Under the facts of this case, the jury could have rationally found
that Mr. Terry's alleged solicitation of Mr. Archibald to purchase
the

controlled

substance

precursors

attempt.
9

actually

constituted

an

Trial counsel's failure to request jury instructions on the
lesser included offenses of possession of controlled substance
precursors and the attempt to commit the alleged crimes fell below
an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment.

But

for counsel's deficient performance of failing to request a lesser
included

offense

convicted

of

instruction, Mr. Terry would

the

enhanced

crime

of

not

clandestine

have been
laboratory

precursors and/or equipment.
Additionally, the trial court plainly erred by failing to
charge the jury with respect to the previously discussed lesser
included offenses.

The record demonstrates

that

there

is a

rational basis in the instant case for a verdict acquitting Mr.
Terry of the enhanced crime of clandestine laboratory precursors
and/or equipment and then convicting him of a lesser included
offense of possession of a controlled substance precursor.
2.

Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel

and the trial court committed plain error by failing to accurately
instruct the jury concerning the law and elements of the charges.
The

failure

possession

of

trial

instruction

counsel
fell

to object
below

an

to the

objective

constructive
standard

of

reasonable professional judgment in light of existing Utah case
law and the underlying factual circumstances of this case.

But

for counsel's deficient performance, Mr. Terry would not have been
10

convicted

of

the

enhanced

crime

of

clandestine

laboratory

precursors and/or equipment.
The

trial

court

committed

plain

error

by

failing

to

accurately instruct the jury on the law of constructive possession
as it applied to the facts of the case.

Further, the error

concerning constructive possession should have been obvious in
light of prior Utah case law and rules concerning a trial court's
duty to accurately instruct the jury and a defendant's right to
have his theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear and
understandable way.

Finally, the error that resulted was harmful

because it precluded the jury from duly and accurately considering
the law as it pertained to the underlying facts of the case.
Trial counsel also failed to request a jury instruction that
accurately

defined

the

conspiracy

element.

Moreover,

trial

counsel failed to request that a special verdict form be utilized
by the jury so that Mr. Terry could determine the variation relied
upon

by

the

jury

to

convict

Precursors and/or Equipment.

him

of

Clandestine

Laboratory

Trial counsel's failures fell below

an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, which
is demonstrated by existing Utah case law, statutory criteria, and
the underlying

factual circumstances

counsel's deficient

of this case.

But for

performance, the outcome would have been

different inasmuch as Mr. Terry would not have been convicted of
11

the enhanced crime of clandestine laboratory precursors and/or
equipment, as a first-degree felony.
Additionally, the trial court plainly erred by failing to
accurately instruct the jury concerning conspiracy as an element
of the crimes charged, which was obvious in light of prior Utah
case law, statutory criteria, and rules concerning a trial court's
duty to accurately instruct the jury on the applicable law.

This

error was harmful because it precluded the jury from duly and
accurately considering the law as it pertained to the facts of the
case as well as requiring the jury to disclose the variation
relied upon in the course of convicting Mr. Terry.
The failure of trial counsel to object to the proposed jury
instructions as an incomplete and thereby inaccurate statement of
the

element

of

intent

fell

below

reasonable professional judgment.

an

objective

standard

of

This is demonstrated by Utah

case law, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-6, and the underlying factual
circumstances

of

the

case.

But

for

counsel's

deficient

performance, the outcome would have been different inasmuch as Mr.
Terry would not have been convicted of the enhanced crime of
clandestine laboratory precursors and/or equipment.
The

trial

court

committed

plain

error

by

failing

to

completely and accurately instruct the jury on the law applicable
to the legal element of intent as it pertained to Counts I and II
12

of the Information.

This error was obvious in light Utah case law

and rules concerning a trial court's duty.

The resulting error

was harmful because it precluded the jury from completely and
accurately considering all the elements of the charges set forth
in Count I and II of the Information.

ARGUMENTS
I.

TRIAL COUNSEL DENIED MR. TERRY OF HIS SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO REQUEST JURY
INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES
OF POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
PRECURSOR.

A.

Ineffective

Assistance

of Counsel

The United States Supreme Court, in Strickland

v.

Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052 (1984), established a two-prong test
for determining when a defendant's Sixth Amendment1 right to
effective assistance of counsel has been denied.
S.Ct. at 2064.

Id.

at 687, 104

This test - adopted by Utah courts - requires a

defendant to show "first, that his counsel rendered a deficient
performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment
and, second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant."

x

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in
relevant part that w[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence."
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Bundy

v. Deland,

Templin,

763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988); accord

805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990); State v.

401, 405 (Utah 1986); State v.
Ct. App. 1995); State
App. 1995).

v.

Perry,

Wright,

State

Frame,

v.

723 P.2d

899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah

893 P.2d 1113, 1119 (Utah Ct.

" [T]he right to the effective assistance of counsel

is recognized not for its own sake, but because of the effect it
has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial."
Lockhart

v. Fretwell,

506 U.S. 364, 369, 113 S. Ct. 838, 842,

(1993) .
To satisfy the first prong of the test, a defendant must
"xidentify the acts or omissions' which, under the circumstances,
x

show

that

counsel's

representation

standard of reasonableness.'"
Strickland,

466

U.S. at

(footnotes omitted)).

Templin,

fell

below

an

objective

805 P.2d at 186 (quoting

690, 688, 104

A defendant must

S. Ct.

at

2066,

2064

"overcome the strong

presumption that trial counsel rendered adequate assistance and
exercised reasonable professional judgment."

State

791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989), cert, denied,

497 U.S. 1024, 110

v.

Bullock,

S.Ct. 3270 (1990).
To show prejudice under the second prong of the test, a
defendant

must

proffer

reasonable probability

sufficient

that, but

evidence

for counsel's

to

support

"a

unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different."
14

Strickland,
at 187.

466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Templin,

"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
Strickland,

undermine confidence in the outcome."
695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; Parsons
1994);

805 P.2d

Frame,

723

P.2d

at

v. Barnes,
405.

466 U.S. at

871 P. 2d 516, 522 (Utah
In

the

course

of

this

determination, the appellate court ''should consider the totality
of the evidence, taking into account such factors as whether the
errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated
effect and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record."
Templin,

805 P.2d at 187.
B.

Lesser

Included

Offenses

Instructions

Trial counsel's failure to request jury instructions on the
lesser included offenses of possession of a controlled substance
precursor as set forth in Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37c-3(12)(k), 5837c-19(2), and 58-37c-20(l) fell below an objective standard of
reasonable

professional

judgment.

This

is

demonstrated

by

existing Utah case law, the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 761-402(3) and (4), and the underlying factual circumstances of this
case.
According to State

v.

Baker,

671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), and

subsequent case law,2 a lesser included offense instruction must
2

The subsequent cases include State v. Smith, 700 P. 2d 1106 (Utah
1985); State
v. Brown, 694 P.2d 587 (Utah 1984); State
v.
Oldroyd,
685 P.2d 551 (Utah 1984); State v. Shabata,
678 P.2d 785 (Utah 1984);
15

be given if

(1) the statutory elements of greater and lesser

included offenses overlap to some degree, and

(2) the evidence

provides a "rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant
of

the

offense
See id.

offense."
see also
Evans,

charged

State

v.

at

and

convicting

him

of

the

included

159 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4));

Kell,

2002 UT 106, f23, 61 P.3d 1019; State

2001 UT 22, fl8, 20 P.3d 888; State

v.

Hansen,

v.

734 P.2d

421, 424 (Utah 1986) . In the course of making this determination,
the court must view the facts in a light most favorable to the
State v.

defendant.
also

State

v.

Velarde,

Spillers,

734 P.2d 449, 453 (Utah 1986);

see

2005 UT App 283, Kl3 . Furthermore, " [t]he

requirements . . . for the inclusion of a lesser included offense
instruction

requested

construed."

Hansen,

by

the

defendant

should

be

liberally

734 P.2d at 424.

The elements of the enhanced crime of clandestine laboratory
precursors and/or equipment, the crime with which Mr. Terry was
charged and convicted, are contained in Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-3 7d4(1) (a) and 58-37d-5(l) (a),3 which state as follows:
It is unlawful for any person to
knowingly or intentionally . . . possess a
controlled substance precursor with the

State
v. Bales,
675 P.2d 573 (Utah 1983); and State
P.2d 527 (Utah 1983).
3

v.

Crick,

675

A copy of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37d-4 (2002) and 58-37d-5 (2002)
are attached hereto as Addendum D.
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intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory
operation;
A person who violates Subsection 58-37d4(1) (a) . . . is guilty of a first degree
felony if the trier of fact also finds any
one of the following conditions occurred in
conjunction with that violation:
(a) possession of a firearm; . . . .
(e) conspire with or aid another to engage
in a clandestine laboratory operation . . . .4
The elements of possession of a controlled substance precursor are
alternatively set forth at Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37c-3(12) (k) , 58370-19(2), and 58-37C-20 (1) ,5 which state:
"Unlawful conduct" as defined in Section
58-1-501 includes knowingly and intentionally
. . . obtaining or attempting to obtain or to
possess any controlled substance precursor or
any combination of controlled substance
precursors knowing or having a reasonable
cause
to
believe
that
the
controlled
substance precursor is intended to be used in
the unlawful manufacture of any controlled
substance.6
* * * *

Any person who is not licensed to engage
in regulated transactions and not excepted
from licensure is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor who, under circumstances not

4

Without the possession-of-firearm condition, the charge of
possession of a controlled substance precursor is a second-degree
felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4(2) (2002).
5

A copy of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37C-3 (12) (2002), 58-37c-19
(2002), and 58-37c-20 (2002) is attached hereto as Addendum E.
6

A violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-3(12)(k) is a seconddegree felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-ll(2) (2002).
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amounting to a violation of Subsection 5837c-3(12) (k) or Subsection 58-37d-4(1) (a) :
(a) possesses more than two ounces of
crystal iodine; or
(b) offers
to
sell,
sells,
or
distributes
crystal
iodine
to
another.
•

*

*

*

Any person who is not licensed to engage
in regulated transactions and not excepted
from licensure who, under circumstances not
amounting to a violation of Subsection 5837c-3(12)(k) or Subsection 58-37d-4(1)(a),
possesses more than 12 grams of ephedrine or
pseudoephedrine, their salts, isomers, or
salts of isomers, or a combination of any of
these substances, is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
According to Baker,

an offense is included in a greater

offense when there is "some relationship" between them and "some
overlap" in the proof that is required to establish the elements
See State

of both offenses.

1986) (citing State v. Hill,

v.

Pitts,

728 P.2d 117, 116 (Utah

674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983)).

In this

case, not only is there is a close relationship between the
enhanced

crime

of

clandestine

laboratory

precursors

and/or

equipment and possession of controlled substance precursors, but
there also is significant overlap in the elements of each offense.
Further, the second part of the Baker
the instant case.

test is satisfied in

The evidence presented during trial provided a

rational basis for the jury to acquit Mr. Terry of the enhanced

18

crime of clandestine laboratory precursors and/or equipment and
then convict him of a lesser included offense of possession of a
controlled substance precursor had those particular instructions
been given (R. 601:24-35; R. 601:82-92; R. 601:115-30).

On the

facts before it, the jury could have rationally found under the
circumstances

of

this case

that Mr. Terry,

at best, merely

possessed the controlled substance precursors of iodine and/or
pseudoephedrine (See id.).

Cf.

State

v. Hopkins,

1999 UT 98, 127,

989 P.2d 1065.
Trial counsel likewise failed to request a jury instruction
concerning the attempt of Mr. Terry to commit the crime of either
the enhanced crime of clandestine laboratory precursors and/or
equipment

and possession

of

controlled

substance precursors.

According to Utah law, "a person is guilty of an attempt to commit
a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required
for

the

commission

of

the

offense,

he

engages

in

conduct

constituting a substantial step toward commission of the offense."
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1) (2002).

Under the facts of the

instant case, the jury could have rationally

found that Mr.

Terry's alleged solicitation of Mr. Archibald to purchase the
controlled substance precursors actually constituted an attempt.7
7

According to Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-102 (2002) , a criminal
attempt to commit a crime results in a one-step reduction of the
charged crime. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-102(2) and (5).
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Trial counsel's failure to request jury instructions on the
lesser included offenses of possession of controlled substance
precursors and the attempt to commit the alleged crimes fell below
an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment in light
of existing Utah case law, the plain language of Utah Code Ann, §§
76-1-402(3) and (4) , Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101, and the underlying
factual circumstances of this case.

But for counsel's deficient

performance

a

of

failing

to request

lesser

included

offense

instruction, Mr. Terry would not have been convicted of the
enhanced

crime

of

clandestine

laboratory

precursors

and/or

equipment.

C.

Plain

Error

In addition to ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial
court committed plain error by failing to charge the jury with
respect to the aforementioned lesser included offenses.
Supreme Court, in State

v.

Dunn,

850 P.2d

1201

The Utah

(Utah 1993),

outlined the following principles involved in determining whether
"plain error" exists:
In general, to establish the existence of
plain error and to obtain appellate relief
from an alleged error that was not properly
objected to, the appellant must show the
following:
(i) An error exists; (ii) the
error should have been obvious to the trial
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e.,
absent the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for
20

the appellant, or phrased differently, our
confidence in the verdict is undermined.
Id.

at 1208-09; see also

1099 (citing State
v. Portillo,
Tenney,

State

v. Helmick,

v. Roth,

2001 UT 103, f5, 37 P.3d

2000 UT 70, %9, 9 P.3d 164);

914 P.2d 724, 726 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); and State

State
v.

913 P.2d 750 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).

The trial court plainly erred by failing to charge the jury
with respect to the previously discussed lesser included offenses.
According to Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) (2002), the trial court
is not "obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included
offense unless

there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting

the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the
included offense." (Emphasis added).
There is a rational basis in the instant case for a verdict
acquitting Mr. Terry of the enhanced crime of possession of
clandestine

laboratory

precursors

and/or

equipment

and

then

convicting him of a lesser included offense of possession of a
controlled substance precursor.

The record demonstrates that Mr.

Terry was neither in actual nor constructive possession of the
controlled substance precursors (R. 601::24-35; R. 601:82-92; R.
601:115-30).

Moreover, Mr. Terry was never in possession of any

clandestine drug lab equipment (R. 601:204-18; cf.
§ 58-37d-6 (2002)) .

21

Utah Code Ann.

This error should have been obvious in light of prior case
law,

statutory language, and various rules concerning a trial

court's obligation and a defendant's right to a lesser-includedoffense charge when such a rational basis exists.

Moreover, the

resulting error was harmful because it precluded the jury from
duly considering the lesser included offenses.

II.

TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL AND THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED
PLAIN ERROR BY FAILING TO ACCURATELY INSTRUCT
THE JURY CONCERNING THE LAW AND ELEMENTS OF
THE CHARGES.

Mr. Terry incorporates the statements of the law and legal
citations pertaining to the Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel previously set forth in Argument I.

In

addition, Mr. Terry incorporates the statements of law and legal
citations pertaining to plain error, which are also set forth in
Argument I.
As a matter of well-settled law, no person accused of a crime
in this country may be convicted of a crime unless each element of
the offense has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Winship,

397 U.S. 358, 362, 90 S. Ct. 1068

(1970).

In

re

Utah law

requires the jury to be instructed with respect to all the legal
elements that it must find to convict a defendant of the crime so
charged.

State v. Jones,

823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991).
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The

absence of such an instruction is reversible error as a matter of
Id.

law.

(citing State

v.

Laine,

618 P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1980)).

"The general rule is that an accurate instruction upon the basic
elements of an offense is essential.
State

constitutes reversible error."
239 (Utah 1985) (citing Laine,
Harmon,
Reedy,

712 P.2d 291, 292

Failure to so instruct
v.

Roberts,

111 P.2d 235,

618 P.2d at 35) ; see
(Utah 1986)

also

State

(per curiam); State

681 P.2d 1251, 1252 (Utah 1984) .

v.
v.

"Thus, the failure to

give this instruction can never be harmless error."

Jones,

823

P.2d at 1061.

A.

Constructive

Possession

Instruction

Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to object to Instruction No. 33,8 which was utilized to
instruct the jury concerning constructive possession.

According

to Utah law, to prove constructive possession there must be a
"sufficient

nexus"

between

the

accused

and

the

controlled

substance precursors to permit an inference that the accused had
both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control
over the controlled substance precursors.

See

State

1999 UT 79, Kl3, 985 P.2d 911 (citing State v. Fox,
319 (Utah 1985)).

v.

Layman,

709 P.2d 316,

In other words, to show constructive possession

8

A true and correct copy of Jury Instruction No. 33 (R. 100) is
attached hereto as Addendum F.
23

in the instant case, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the controlled substance precursors "were subject to
the defendant's dominion and control and the defendant had the
intent to exercise that control."

Id.

at fl6 (citing Fox,

709

P.2d at 318) .
According to the evidence presented in the instant case, no
one but the police took possession, either actual or constructive,
of the controlled substance precursors (R. 601:37-38; R. 601:12930) . Indisputably, the police in the instant case at all relevant
times had direct custody, dominion, and control of the controlled
substance

precursors

over

constructive possession.

which

Mr.

Terry

allegedly

had

Consequently, the State, as a matter of

impossibility, could not have proven that Mr. Terry constructively
possessed the controlled substance precursors.

At the very most,

the factual circumstances of the case constituted an alleged
constructive possession or an alleged conspiracy to possess the
controlled substance precursors.
The failure of trial counsel to object to Instruction No. 33
fell

below

an

objective

standard

of

reasonable

professional

judgment in light of existing Utah case law and the underlying
factual circumstances of this case.9

But for counsel's deficient

performance, the outcome would have been different in that Mr.
9

See Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e).
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Terry would not have been convicted of the enhanced crime of
clandestine laboratory precursors and/or equipment.
"A trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the law
applicable to the facts of the case."

See State

P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992) (citing State v. Potter,
(Utah 1981) ). 1 0

v. Hamilton,

827

627 P.2d 75, 78

Based upon established principles of plain error,

the trial court committed plain error by failing to accurately
instruct the jury on the law applicable to the facts of the case.
The error concerning constructive possession should have been
obvious in light of prior Utah case law and rules concerning a
trial court's duty and a defendant's right "to have his theory of
the case presented to the jury in a clear and understandable way."
Potter,

627 P. 2d at 78.

Further, the error that resulted was

harmful because it precluded the jury from duly and accurately
considering the law as it pertained to the underlying facts of the
case.

B,

Conspiracy

Instruction

For the jury to convict Mr. Terry of Clandestine Laboratory
Precursors and/or Equipment as set forth in Counts I and II of the
Information, the jury had to find that the State had proved beyond
a reasonable doubt that Mr. Terry " [k]nowingly or intentionally;
. . . [p]ossessed a controlled substance precursor with the intent
10

See Utah R. Crim. P. 19(a).
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to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation; AND/OR .
[c]onspired with or aided another to engage in a clandestine
laboratory operation . . . ." (R. 92-94) -11 According to Utah Code
Ann. § 76-4-201 (2002) , "a person is guilty of conspiracy when he,
intending that conduct constituting a crime be performed, agrees
with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of
the conduct and any one of them commits an overt act in pursuance
of the conspiracy . . . ."
Trial counsel

failed to request a jury instruction that

accurately defined the conspiracy element as set forth in Utah
Code Ann. § 76-4-201.

Moreover, trial counsel failed to request

that a special verdict form be utilized by the jury so that Mr.
Terry, as the accused, could determine which variation the jury
relied

upon

in the

course

of

convicting

him

of

Clandestine

Laboratory Precursors and/or Equipment.
In State v.
charged

the

operations,

Hopkins,

defendant
which

with

included

criteria for conviction.
verdict

1999 UT 98, 989 P.2d 1073, the State

Id.

form was utilized,

unlawful
multiple

clandestine
variations

laboratory

of

statutory

at 1(27. However, because no special
the Court determined

that

it was

possible that the jury relied upon the subsection that includes

1:L

A true and correct copy of Jury Instructions Nos. 28 and 29 (R.
92-94) are attached hereto as Addendum G.
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all the elements for conviction of possession of a controlled
substance

precursor

as

a

lesser

included

offense.

Id.

Consequently, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the conviction for
precursor possession.

See

id.

Trial counsel's failure to propose a jury instruction that
accurately defined the conspiracy element and the failure to
request that a special verdict form be utilized by the jury fell
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment.
This

is

demonstrated

by

existing

Utah

case

law,

statutory

criteria, and the underlying factual circumstances of this case.
But for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome would have
been different inasmuch as Mr. Terry would not have been convicted
of the enhanced crime of clandestine laboratory precursors and/or
equipment as a first-degree felony.

Had a special verdict form

been requested and utilized, Mr. Terry would have been provided
with notice of the variation relied upon by the jury in the course
of convicting him under Counts I and II of the Information.

In

the event that the jury had relied upon the conspiracy variation,
which would have been revealed by way of the special verdict form,
the conviction would have been reduced to a second-degree felony
or one classification pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-202(2)
(2002) .
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"A trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the law
applicable to the facts of the case."

See State

P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992) (citing State v.

Potter,

v. Hamilton,

827

627 P.2d 75, 78

(Utah 1981)) . Based upon established principles of plain error,
the trial court plainly erred by failing to accurately instruct
the jury on the law applicable to the facts of the case.
The error concerning conspiracy as an element of the crimes
charged was obvious in light of prior Utah case law, statutory
criteria, and rules concerning a trial court's duty to accurately
instruct the jury on the applicable law.
78.

See Potter,

627 P.2d at

This error was harmful because it precluded the jury from

duly and accurately considering the law as it pertained to the
facts of the case as well as requiring the jury to disclose the
variation

relied

upon

in

the

course

of

arriving

at

the

convictions.

C.

Intent

Instruction

As previously discussed, before the jury could convict Mr.
Terry of Clandestine Laboratory Precursors and/or Equipment as set
forth in Counts I and II of the Information, it had to find that
the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Terry
u

[k]nowingly or intentionally;

. . . [p] ossessed a controlled

substance precursor with the intent to engage in a clandestine
laboratory operation; AND/OR

. . . [c]onspired with or aided
28

another to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation . . . ."
(R.

92-94).

Utah

Code

Ann.

§

58-37d-6

(2002)

specifically

designates the circumstances under which the jury, as the trier of
fact,

may

infer

that

a

defendant

clandestine laboratory operation.

intended

to

engage

in

a

That provision states:

The
trier of fact may
infer
that
the
defendant intended to engage in a clandestine
laboratory operation if the defendant:
(1) is in illegal possession of a controlled
substance precursor; or
(2) illegally possesses
or
attempts
to
illegally possess a controlled
substance
precursor and is in possession of any one of
the following pieces of equipment:
(a) glass reaction vessel;
(b) separatory funnel;
(c) glass condenser;
(d) analytical balance; or
(e) heating mantle.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-6

(2002).

The failure of trial counsel to object to the proposed jury
instructions as an incomplete and thereby inaccurate statement of
the elements and relevant law fell below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment, which is demonstrated existing
Utah case

law, Utah Code Ann.

§ 58-37d-6, and

factual circumstances of the case.

the

underlying

But for counsel's deficient

performance, the outcome would have been different inasmuch as Mr.
Terry would not have been convicted
clandestine

laboratory

precursors
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of

and/or

the

enhanced

equipment.

crime of
This

is

particularly applicable in light of the foregoing

ineffective

assistance of counsel and plain error arguments.
According to Utah law, the jury must be instructed as to all
the legal elements that it must find to convict a defendant of the
crime so charged -- the absence of which is reversible error.
State
Laine,

v.

Jones,

823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991) (citing State

618 P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1980)); see

also

State

v.

v.

Roberts,

111 P.2d 235, 239 (Utah 1985) (stating that "[t]he general rule is
that an accurate instruction upon the basic elements of an offense
is essential.").

The trial court plainly erred by failing to

completely and accurately instruct the jury on the law applicable
to the legal element of intent as it pertained to Counts I and II
of the Information.
This

error

was

obvious

in

light

of

the

trial

court's

obligation to so instruct the jury, which is well-established by
Utah case law and rules concerning a trial court's duty.

The

resulting error was harmful because it precluded the jury from
completely and accurately considering all the elements of the
charges set forth in Count I and II of the Information.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Terry respectfully requests that
this Court reverse his convictions and remand the case to the
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trial court for a new trial or, in the alternative, that this
Court reverse Mr. Terry's convictions and enter judgment for the
lesser included offenses together with any relief the Court deems
just and appropriate under the circumstances of the case.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of July, 2005.
'ARNOLDVVIGGINS /

p

•c•

^Scott L tffigginfs
Atto^fi^ys f o ^ J ^ p ^ l l a n t
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P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake Cit7>sJJTC 84XL4-0854
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Exhibit A

MELVIN C. WILSON
Davis County Attorney
P. O. Box 618
800 West State Street
Fartnington, Utah 84025
Telephone: (801)451-4300
Fax:
(801)451-4328
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ROBERT CARL TERRY,
DOB: 08/18/1959,
Defendant.

Bail:
INFORMATION/COMPLAINT
FOR FORFEITURE
^
OTN 12259776

f^Q^A

The undersigned officer states on information and belief that the defendant, on or
about March 21, 2001, at County of Davis, State of Utah, committed the crimes of:
COUNT 1
CLANDESTI>ffiLABORATORYPRECURSORSAND/OREQUIPMENT(58-37d4 and 58-37d-5), afirstdegree felony, as follows: That at the time and place aforesaid, the defendant,
as a party, knowingly or intentionally (A) possessed a controlled substance precursor with the intent
to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation; (B) conspired with or aided another to engage in a
clandestine laboratory operation; and in so doing possessed a firearm.
COUNT 2
CLANDESTINE LABORATORY PRECURSORS AND/OR EQUIPMENT (58-3 7d4 and 58-37d-5), afirstdegree felony, as follows: That at the time and place aforesaid, the defendant,
as a party, knowingly or intentionally (A) possessed a controlled substance precursor with the intent
to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation; (B) conspired with or aided another to engage in a
clandestine laboratory operation; and in so doing possessed a firearm.

COUNT 3
FAILURE TO RESPOND TO OFFICERS SIGNAL TO STOP (41-6-13.5), a third
degree felony, as follows: That at the time and place aforesaid, the defendant did operate a motor
vehicle and, having received a visual or audible signal from a peace officer to bring his vehicle to a
stop, did operate his vehicle in willful or wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or
endanger the operation of any vehicle or person; or did attempt to flee or elude a peace officer by
vehicle or other means.
COUNT 4
CARRYING A CONCEALED DANGEROUS WEAPON (76-10-504(1)), a class B
misdemeanor, as follows: That at the time and place aforesaid, the defendant did carry a concealed
dangerous weapon, (A) which was not a firearm on his person or one that was readily accessible for
immediate use which is not securely encased, as defined in this part, in a place other than his
residence, property, or business under his control; or (B) which was a firearm that contained no
ammunition without a valid concealed firearm permit.
COUNT 5
NOTICE OF SEIZURE AND NOTICE OF INTENT TO FORFEIT
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 58-37-13, et seq., that
the following property was seized on or about March 21, 2001, incident to an arrest of defendant,
to wit: 1997 Chevy Camaro bearing VIN #2G1FP22P9V2152515 and license plate 10-MYSS
registered to Robert Terry and Fourteen Thousand Four Dollars and 50/100 Dollars ($14,004.50)
in U.S. Currency.
NOTICE IS FURTHER GIVEN that the State of Utah intends to seek the forfeiture
of the said seized 1997 Chevy Camaro bearing VIN #2G1FP22P9V2152515 and license plate 10-

/ <?

MYSS registered to Robert Terry and Fourteen Thousand Four Dollars and 50/100 Dollars
($14,004.50) in U.S. Currency, and to forfeit and confiscate any right, title or interest that defendant
may claim to have in and to said property.
This information is based on evidence obtained from witness Jeff Jensen.
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:

The undersigned officer has received

information from the investigating officer, Jeff Jensen of the Davis Metro Narcotics Strike Force, and
the Information herein is based upon such personal observations and investigation of said officer.
1. On March 22, 2001, defendant provided Jeffery Archibald $ 11,800 in cash for the
purchase of chemical precursors. Agents working for the Davis Metro Narcotics Strike Force, met
with Mr. Archibald who then used the money to purchase 10 pounds of iodine and four cases of
pseudoephedrine.
2. At the time of the above transaction, defendant was driving a 1997 Chevy Camaro.
When officers attempted to stop defendant, he fled the area and a chase ensued
3. In addition to the $11,800 that defendant used to purchase the above chemicals,
$2,204.50 in cash was found in defendant's possession. Because the 1997 Chevy Camaro and the
cash could easily be disposed of, hidden or transported out of State, they were seized without a
warrant.

Affiant

is **•"«->
*A? day
dayofof
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

_/ /y/ fOtSH^
f i ^ V ^ ,12001

Authorized March 23, 2001,
for presentment and filing:
MELVIN C. WILSON
Davis County Attorney

Deputy Davis/County

A felony of the first degree carries a possible maximum penalty of five years to life imprisonment
and/or up to $10,000 fine. Conviction of a drug-related offense requires immediate suspension of
defendant's drivers license for six months under Utah Code Annotated. 53-3-220(1 )(c).
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE (J)F U mpf EB 2 4 ?004 I
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT

SECOND
DISTniCT COURT

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff,

v.

SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT
AND COMMITMENT TO THE UTAH
STATE PRISON

ROBERT CARL TERRY,
Defendant.
Case No. 011700517
That whereas said defendant, having been convicted at trial on Count 1 and 2 to the
crimes of Clandestine
Laboratory Precursors and/or Equipment (58-37d-4 and 58-37d-5),
felonies of the 1rdst degree, Count 3 Fail to Stop/Respond at Command of Police Officer, a
Felony of the 3 degree, and Count 4 to Carrying Concealed Dangerous Weapon, a Class A
Misdemeanor, and now being present in Court and now being present in Court accompanied by
his attorney and ready for sentence, thereupon the Court renders its judgment.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT:
The defendant is sentenced to the Utah State Prison on Counts 1 and 2 for an
indeterminate term of 5 years to life in each count, Count 3 for an indeterminate term of 0-5
years, Count 4 to 6 months in the Davis County Jail, may be served at the Utah State Prison.
Court recommendations: The Court recommends that each count run concurrent with
the other. Please notify Judges Michael G. Allphin, Glen R. Dawson, and Prosecutor Michael
Direda immediately if Defendant is to be released from the Utah State Prison.
Dated September 9, 2002, with the Seal of the Court affixed hereto.
BY THE COURT:
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cRobert Karl Terry
Central Utah Correctional facility
USP# 33680
P.O. Box 550
Gunnison, UT 84634
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Attorney Pro Se

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 011700517

ROBERT'KARI
KARL TERRY,

Judge Michael G. Allphin

Defendant.

Defendant, appearing pro se, hereby submits the following NOTICE OF APPEAL
pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
1.

Party Taking Appeal: Defendant, Robert Terry.

2.

Judgment or Order:

Judgment of Conviction (1) Clandestine

Laboratory Precursors and/or Equipment (Section 58-37d-4(a)(e) and 58-37d5(a); (2) Clandestine Laboratory Precursors and/or Equipment (Section 58-37d4(a)(e) and 58-37d-5(a); (3) Failure to Respond to an Officer's Signal to Stop
(Section 41-6-13.5); and (4) Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon (Section
76-10-504(1). Convicted after jury trial on November 13, 2002. Re-sentenced by
Judge Allphm on February 23, 2004 as follows: two sentences of 5 to life; one
sentence of 0-5.

3.

Court from which appeal is taken: Second District Court, Davis County,
Judge Allphin.

4.

Court to which appeal is taken: Utah Court of Appeals.

Dated: /tinted

/ < - , 2004

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:

Robert £arl Terry
Pro Se Defendant

'

Sl<f

Certificate of Mailing
The undersigned hereby represents that on __3 ~ ID
2004,1 mailed a true
copy of the attached Notice of Appeal, first class mail, postage pre-paid, to the following:
Mike Direda
Davis County Attorney
P.O. Box 618
800 West State Street
Farmington, UT 84025

NOfARY PUBLIC
ROSE MARIE VAN DYKE
2^5 E 300 N
P O BOX 898
GUNNISON UT 84634
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES
FEBRUARY 14 2006
S l A l t OFUTAH
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(c) "Controlled substance precursor" means those chemicals designated
in Title 58, Chapter 37c, Controlled Substance Precursor Act, except those
substances designated in Subsections 58-37c-3(2)(kk) and (11).
(d) "Disposal" means the abandonment, discharge, deposit, injection,
dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any hazardous or dangerous
material into or on any property, land or water so that the material may
enter the environment, be emitted into the air, or discharged into any
waters, including groundwater.
(e) "Hazardous or dangerous material" means any substance which
because of its quantity, concentration, physical characteristics, or chemical
characteristics may cause or significantly contribute to an increase in
mortality, an increase in serious illness, or may pose a substantial present
or potential future hazard to human health or the environment when
improperly treated, stored, transported, disposed of, or otherwise improperly managed.
(f) "Illegal manufacture of specified controlled substances" means in
violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act, the:
(i) compounding, synthesis, concentration, purification, separation,
extraction, or other physical or chemical processing for the purpose of
producing methamphetamine, other amphetamine compounds as
listed in Schedule I of the Utah Controlled Substances Act, phencyclidine, narcotic analgesic analogs as listed in Schedule I of the Utah
Controlled Substances Act, lysergic acid diethylamide, mescaline;
(ii) conversion of cocaine or methamphetamine to their base forms;
or
(iii) extraction, concentration, or synthesis of marijuana as that
drug is defined in Section 58-37-2.
(2) Unless otherwise specified, the definitions in Section 58-37-2 also apply
to this chapter.
History: C. 1953, 58-37d-3, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 156, § 3; 1993, ch. 4, § 95; 1997, ch.
64, § 10; 2000, ch. 272, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, m Subsection (l)(c)

substituted "Controlled Substance Precursor
Act" for "Controlled Substances Precursor Act"
and "Subsections 58-37c-3(2)(kk) and (11)" for
"Subsections 58-37c-3(2)(gg) and (2)(hh) "

58-37d-4. Prohibited acts — Second degree felony.
(1) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally:
(a) possess a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage
in a clandestine laboratory operation;
(b) possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage
in a clandestine laboratory operation;
(c) sell, distribute, or otherwise supply a precursor chemical, laboratory
equipment, or laboratory supplies knowing or having reasonable cause to
believe it will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation;
(d) evade recordkeeping provisions of Title 58, Chapter 37c, Controlled
Substances Precursor Act, or the regulations issued under that act,
knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the material distributed or received will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation;
(e) conspire with or aid another to engage in a clandestine laboratory
operation;
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(f) produce or manufacture, or possess with intent to produce or
manufacture a controlled or counterfeit substance except as authorized
under Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act; or
(g) transport or convey a controlled or counterfeit substance with the
intent to distribute or to be distributed by the person transporting or
conveying the controlled or counterfeit substance or by any other person
regardless of whether the final destination for the distribution is within
this state or any other location.
(2) A person who violates any provision of Subsection (1) is guilty of a second
degree felony.
History: C. 1953, 58-37d-4, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 156, § 4; 1997, ch. 64, § 11.

Cross-References. — Sentencing for felomes, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Lesser included offense.
Because no special verdict form was used,
and because it was possible that the jury relied
upon Subsection (l)(a) in reaching its verdict,
which includes all the elements for conviction of
possession of a controlled substance precursor,
the defendant was entitled to reversal of his
conviction for possession of a controlled sub-

stance precursor as a lesser included offense of
operating a methamphetamine laboratory
State v Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, 989 P2d 1065
Possession of methamphetamine in violation
of § 58-37-8 was not a lesser included offense of
possession of equipment or supplies with intent
to engage m a clandestine laboratory operation
State v Roth, 2001 UT 103, 37 P3d 1099

58-37d-5. Prohibited acts — First degree felony.
(1) A person who violates Subsection 58-37d-4(l)(a), (b), (e), or (f) is guilty of
a first degree felony if the trier of fact also finds any one of the following
conditions occurred in conjunction with that violation:
(a) possession of a firearm;
(b) use of a booby trap;
(c) illegal possession, transportation, or disposal of hazardous or dangerous material or while transporting or causing to be transported
materials in furtherance of a clandestine laboratory operation, there was
created a substantial risk to human health or safety or a danger to the
environment;
(d) intended laboratory operation was to take place or did take place
within 500 feet of a residence, place of business, church, or school;
(e) clandestine laboratory operation actually produced any amount of a
specified controlled substance; or
(f) intended clandestine laboratory operation was for the production of
cocaine base or methamphetamine base.
(2) If the trier of fact finds that two or more of the conditions listed in
Subsections (l)(a) through (f) of this section occurred in conjunction with the
violation, at sentencing for the first degree felony:
(a) probation shall not be granted;
(b) the execution or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended; and
(c) the court shall not enter a judgment for a lower category of offense.
History: C. 1953, 58-37d-5, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 156, § 5; 1997, ch. 64, § 12; 1998,
ch. 65, § 1; 2000, ch. 187, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-

merit, effective May 4, 1998, inserted "or was
conducted in the presence of" after "involved" in
Subsection (l)(e)
The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000,
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deleted former Subsection (l)(e), which concerned clandestine drug laboratory operations
involving or conducted in the presence of persons under 18. A similar provision was enacted
as Section 76-5-112.5.

58-37d-7

Cross-References. — Sentencing for felonies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Lesser included offenses.
Sufficiency of evidence
Lesser included offenses.
Because no special verdict form was used,
and because it was possible that the jury relied
upon Subsection 58-37d-4(l)(a) in reaching its
verdict, which includes all the elements for
conviction of possession of a controlled substance precursor, the defendant was entitled to
reversal of his conviction for possession of a
controlled substance precursor as a lesser ineluded offense of operating a methamphetamine laboratory. State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT
98, 989 P.2d 1065.

Possession of methamphetamme in violation
c*x § 58-37-8 was not a lesser included offense of
possession of equipment or supplies with intent
t o e n g a g e m a c l a n d e s t m e laboratory operation.
State v Roth, 2001 UT 103, 37 P.3d 1099.
Sufficiency of evidence.
Where the defendant did not acknowledge,
let alone marshal, the evidence presented at
trial, but described only fragmented portions of
the evidence, the Supreme Court declined to
consider his contention that the evidence was
insufficient for conviction State v Hopkins,
1999 UT 98, 989 P.2d 1065

58-37d-6. Legal inference of intent — Illegal possession of
a controlled substance precursor or clandestine
laboratory equipment.
The trier of fact may infer that the defendant intended to engage in a
clandestine laboratory operation if the defendant:
(1) is in illegal possession of a controlled substance precursor; or
(2) illegally possesses or attempts to illegally possess a controlled
substance precursor and is in possession of any one of the following pieces
of equipment:
(a) glass reaction vessel;
(b) separatory funnel;
(c) glass condenser;
(d) analytical balance; or
(e) heating mantle.
History: C. 1953, 58-37d-6, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 156, § 6.

58-37d-7. Seizure and forfeiture.
Chemicals, equipment, supplies, vehicles, aircraft, vessels, and personal and
real property used in furtherance of a clandestine laboratory operation are
subject to seizure and forfeiture under the procedures and substantive protections of Title 24, Chapter 1, Utah Uniform Forfeiture Procedures Act.
History: C. 1953, 58-37d-7, enacted by L.
1992, eh. 156, § 7 ; Initiative B, 2000,
adopted Nov. 7, 2000; 2002, ch. 185, § 36.
Amendment Notes. — The amendment by
2000 Initiative B, effective March 20, 2001,

substituted the language beginning "and substantive protections" for "of Section 58-37-13."
The 2002 amendment, effective May 6, 2002,
updated the statutory reference
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CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE PRECURSOR ACT
Section
58-37c-19.9.

58-37c-3

Section

58-37c-20.

Anhydrous ammonia is a precursor — Requirements regarding purposes and containers.
Possession of ephedrine or

58-37c-l.

Short title.

58-37c-21.

pseudoephedrine — Penalties.
Department of Public Safety
enforcement authority.

This act shall be known as the "Utah Controlled Substance Precursor Act."
History: C. 1953, 58-37c-l, enacted by L.
1992, ch, 155, § 1.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1992, ch. 155, §§ 1 repeals former §§ 58-37c-l
to 58-37c-10, as enacted by L. 1989, ch. 186,
§§ 2 to 11 and as last amended by L. 1990, ch.
180, §§ 1 to 5, relating to regulation of con-

trolled substance precursors, and enacts
present §§ 58-37c-l to 58-37c-10, effective July
1, 1992.
Meaning of "this act.* — The term "this
w
ac t means Laws 1992, ch. 155, which repealed
^ d reenacted this chapter.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 25 Am. Jur. 2d Drugs and
Controlled Substances § 17 et seq.

58-37c-2.

C.J.S. — 28 C.J.S. Drugs and Narcotics
§ 117 et seq.

Purpose.

The purpose of this act is to provide for the licensure of regulated distributors and regulated purchasers engaged in regulated transactions of listed
controlled substance precursor chemicals as they are identified in the act or
rules adopted pursuant to the act, to provide for maintaining of records and
submission of reports with respect to regulated transactions, to provide for
reasonable and necessary regulation of defined types of transactions, to
provide that violation of the provisions of this act shall be unlawful and
unprofessional conduct, and to provide for criminal and administrative actions
for that conduct.
History: C. 1953, 58-37c-2, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 155, § 2.
Meaning of "this act." — The term "this

58-37c-3.

act" means Laws 1992, ch. 155, which repealed
and reenacted this chapter.

Definitions.

In addition to the definitions in Section 58-1-102, as used in this chapter:
(1) "Board" means the Controlled Substance Precursor Advisory Board
created in Section 58-37c-4.
(2) "Controlled substance precursor" includes a chemical reagent and
means any of the following:
(a) Phenyl-2-propanone;
(b) Methylamine;
(c) Ethylamine;
(d) D-lysergic acid;
(e) Ergotamine and its salts;
(f) Diethyl malonate;
(g) Malonic acid;
(h) Ethyl malonate;
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(i) Barbituric acid;
(j) Piperidine and its salts;
(k) N-acetylanthranilic acid and its salts;
(I) Pyrrolidine;
(m) Phenylacetic acid and its salts;
(n) Anthranilic acid and its salts;
(o) Morpholine;
(p) Ephedrine;
(q) Pseudoephedrine;
(r) Norpseudoephedrine;
(s) Phenylpropanolamine;
(t) Benzyl cyanide;
(u) Ergonovine and its salts;
(v) 3,4-Methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone;
(w) propionic anhydride;
(x) Insosafrole;
(y) Safrole;
(z) Piperonal;
(aa) N-Methylephedrine;
(bb) N-ethylephedrine;
(cc) N-methylpseudoephedrine;
(dd) N-ethylpseudoephedrine;
(ee) Hydriotic acid;
(ff) gamma butyrolactone (GBL), including butyrolactone, 1,2
butanolide, 2-oxanolone, tetrahydro-2-furanone,
dihydro-2(3H)furanone, and tetramethylene glycol, but not including gamma
aminobutric acid (GABA);
(gg) 1,4 butanediol;
(hh) any salt, isomer, or salt of an isomer of the chemicals listed in
Subsections (2)(a) through (gg);
(ii) Crystal iodine;
(jj) Iodine at concentrations greater than 1.5% by weight in a
solution or matrix;
(kk) Red phosphorous, except as provided in Section 58-37c-19.7;
(II) anhydrous ammonia, except as provided in Section 58-37c-19.9;
(mm) any controlled substance precursor listed under the provisions of the Federal Controlled Substances Act which is designated by
t h e director under the emergency listing provisions set forth in
Section 58-37c-14; and
(nn) any chemical which is designated by the director under the
emergency listing provisions set forth in Section 58-37c-14.
(3) "Deliver," "delivery," "transfer," or "furnish" means the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer of a controlled substance precursor.
(4) "Matrix" means something, as a substance, in which something else
originates, develops, or is contained.
(5) "Person" means any individual, group of individuals, proprietorship,
partnership, joint venture, corporation, or organization of any type or
kind.
(6) "Practitioner" means a physician, dentist, podiatric physician, veterinarian, pharmacist, scientific investigator, pharmacy, hospital, pharmaceutical manufacturer, or other person licensed, registered, or other268
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wise permitted to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to,
administer, or use in teaching, or chemical analysis a controlled substance
in the course of professional practice or research in this state.
(7) (a) "Regulated distributor" means a person within the state who
provides, sells, furnishes, transfers, or otherwise supplies a listed
controlled substance precursor chemical in a regulated transaction.
(b) "Regulated distributor" does not include any person excluded
from regulation under this chapter.
(8) (a) "Regulated purchaser" means any person within the state who
receives a listed controlled substance precursor chemical in a regulated transaction.
(b) "Regulated purchaser" does not include any person excluded
from regulation under this chapter.
(9) "Regulated transaction" means any actual, constructive or attempted:
(a) transfer, distribution, delivery, or furnishing by a person within
the state to another person within or outside of the state of a threshold
amount of a listed precursor chemical; or
(b) purchase or acquisition by any means by a person within the
state from another person within or outside the state of a threshold
amount of a listed precursor chemical.
(10) "Retail distributor" means a grocery store, general merchandise
store, drug store, or other entity or person whose activities as a distributor
are limited almost exclusively to sales for personal use:
(a) in both number of sales and volume of sales; and
(b) either directly to walk-in customers or in face-to-face transactions by direct sales.
(11) "Threshold amount of a listed precursor chemical" means any
amount of a controlled substance precursor or a specified amount of a
controlled substance precursor in a matrix; however, the division may
exempt from the provisions of this chapter a specific controlled substance
precursor in a specific amount and in certain types of transactions which
provisions for exemption shall be defined by the division by rule adopted
pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(12) "Unlawful conduct" as defined in Section 58-1-501 includes knowingly and intentionally:
(a) engaging in a regulated transaction without first being appropriately licensed or exempted from licensure under this chapter;
(b) acting as a regulated distributor and selling, transferring, or in
any other way conveying a controlled substance precursor to a person
within the state who is not appropriately licensed or exempted from
licensure as a regulated purchaser, or selling, transferring, or otherwise conveying a controlled substance precursor to a person outside of
the state and failing to report the transaction as required;
(c) acting as a regulated purchaser and purchasing or in any other
way obtaining a controlled substance precursor from a person within
the state who is not a licensed regulated distributor, or purchasing or
otherwise obtaining a controlled substance precursor from a person
outside of the state and failing to report the transaction as required;
(d) engaging in a regulated transaction and failing to submit
reports and keep required records of inventories required under the
provisions of this chapter or rules adopted pursuant to this chapter;
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(e) making any false statement in any application for license, in
any record to be kept, or on any report submitted as required under
this chapter;
(f) with the intent of causing the evasion of the recordkeeping or
reporting requirements of this chapter and rules related to this
chapter, receiving or distributing any listed controlled substance
precursor chemical in any manner designed so that the making of
records or filing of reports required under this chapter is not required;
(g) failing to take immediate steps to comply with licensure,
reporting, or recordkeeping requirements of this chapter because of
lack of knowledge of those requirements, upon becoming informed of
the requirements;
(h) presenting false or fraudulent identification where or when
receiving or purchasing a listed controlled substance precursor chemical;
(i) creating a chemical mixture for the purpose of evading any
licensure, reporting or recordkeeping requirement of this chapter or
rules related to this chapter, or receiving a chemical mixture created
for that purpose;
(j) if the person is at least 18 years of age, employing, hiring, using,
persuading, inducing,'enticing, or coercing another person under 18
years of age to violate any provision of this chapter, or assisting in
avoiding detection or apprehension for any violation of this chapter by
any federal, state, or local law enforcement official; and
(k) obtaining or attempting to obtain or to possess any controlled
substance precursor or any combination of controlled substance
precursors knowing or having a reasonable cause to believe that the
controlled substance precursor is intended to be used in the unlawful
manufacture of any controlled substance.
(13) "Unprofessional conduct" as defined in Section 58-1-102 and as
may be further defined by rule includes the following:
(a) violation of any provision of this chapter, the Controlled Substance Act of this state or any other state, or the Federal Controlled
Substance Act; and
(b) refusing to allow agents or representatives of the division or
authorized law enforcement personnel to inspect inventories or controlled substance precursors or records or reports relating to purchases and sales or distribution of controlled substance precursors as
such records and reports are required under this chapter.
History: C. 1953, 58-37c-3, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 155, § 3; 1993, ch. 297, § 183; 1996,
ch. 232, § 11; 1998, ch. 100, § 1; 2000, ch.
271, § 3; 2000, ch. 272, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, inserted "includes
a chemical reagent and" in Subsection (2); deleted "its salts, optical isomers, and salts of
optical isomers" after 'the controlled substance
precursor" in Subsections (2)(p) to (2)(s); deleted "optical" before "isomer" twice in Subsection (2)(ff), added Subsection (2)(gg), redesignating existing Subsections (2)(gg) and (2)(hh)
as (2)(hh) and (2)(n), and added Subsections (4)

and (10), redesignating the other subsections
accordingly.
The 2000 amendment by ch. 271, effective
May 1, 2000, added Subsections (2)(ff) and
(2)(gg), redesignating the remaining subsections accordingly and making related changes
The 2000 amendment by ch. 272, effective
May 1, 2000, added Subsections (2Xhh) to
(2)(jj), redesignating existing Subsections
(2)(hh) and (2)(ii) as (2)(kk) and (2)(11), and
added "or a specified amount of a controlled
substance precursor in a matrix" in Subsection
(11).
This section is set out as reconciled by the
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Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Federal Law. — The federal Controlled Substances Act, cited in Subsections (2)(mm) and

58-37C-6

(13)(a), is codified primarily as 21 U.S.C.S.
§ 801 et seq.
Cross-References. — Controlled substances, Title 58, Chapter 37.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Lesser included offenses.
Because no special verdict form was used,
and because it was possible that the jury relied
upon Subsection 58-37d-4(l)(a) in reaching its
verdict, which provision includes all the elements for conviction of possession of a con-

trolled substance precursor, the defendant was
entitled to reversal of his conviction for possession of a controlled substance precursor as a
lesser included offense of operating a methamphetamine laboratory. State v. Hopkins, 1999
UT 98, 989 P. 2d 1065.

58-37c-4. Board.
(1) There is hereby established a Controlled Substance Precursor Advisory
Board which shall consist of four individuals representing distributors and
purchasers of controlled substance precursors and one member from the
general public.
(2) The board shall be appointed and serve in accordance with Section
58-1-201.
(3) The duties and responsibilities of the board shall be in accordance with
Sections 58-1-202 and 58-1-203.
History: C. 1953, 58-37c-4, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 155, § 4; 1993, ch. 297, § 184.

58-37c-5. Responsibility of Department of Commerce —
Delegation to the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing — Rulemaking authority
of the division.
(1) Responsibility for the enforcement of the licensing and reporting provisions of this chapter shall be with the Department of Commerce.
(2) The executive director shall delegate specific responsibility within the
department to the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing.
(3) The division shall make, adopt, amend, and repeal rules necessary for
the proper administration and enforcement of this chapter.
History: C. 1953, 58-37c-5, enacted by L.
1992, ch, 155, § 5.
Cross-References. — Administrative rule-

making, Title 63, Chapter 46a
Department of Commerce, Title 13, Chapter
1.

58-37c-6. Division duties.
The division shall be responsible for the licensing and reporting provisions of
this chapter and those duties shall include:
(1) providing for a system of licensure of regulated distributors and
regulated purchasers;
(2) refusing to renew a license or revoking, suspending, restricting,
placing on probation, issuing a private or public letter of censure or
reprimand, or imposing other appropriate action against a license;
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History: C. 1953, 58-37c-18, enacted by L.
1998, ch. 100, § 3; 1999, ch. 21, § 55.
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, substituted "Section 58-37c-10" for "Section 58-37-10" in Subsection (l)(a).
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1998, ch 101

58-37c-19.5

also enacted a § 58-37c-18; that section has
been renumbered as § 58-37c-21.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch. 100
became effective on May 4, 1998, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
Cross-References. — Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301

58-37c-19. Possession or sale of crystal iodine.
(1) Any person licensed to engage in a regulated transaction is guilty of a
class B misdemeanor who, under circumstances not amounting to a violation
of Subsection 58-37d-4(l)(c), offers to sell, sells, or distributes more than two
ounces of crystal iodine to another person who is:
(a) not licensed as a regulated purchaser of crystal iodine;
(b) not excepted from licensure; or
(c) not excepted under Subsection (3).
(2) Any person who is not licensed to engage in regulated transactions and
not excepted from licensure is guilty of a class A misdemeanor who, under
circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection 58-37c-3(12)(k) or
Subsection 58-37d-4(l)(a):
(a) possesses more than two ounces of crystal iodine; or
(b) offers to sell, sells, or distributes crystal iodine to another.
(3) Subsection (2)(a) does not apply to:
(a) a chemistry laboratory maintained by:
(i) a public or private regularly established secondary school; or
(ii) a public or private institution of higher education that is
accredited by a regional or national accrediting agency recognized by
the United States Department of Education;
(b) a veterinarian licensed to practice under Title 58, Chapter 28,
Veterinary Practice Act; or
(c) a general acute hospital.
History: C. 1953, 58-37c-19, enacted by L.
1998, ch. 100, § 4; 2000, ch. 1, § 97.
Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, substituted "Subsection 58-37c-3(12)(k)" for "Subsection 58-37c3(10)(kr in the introductory paragraph of
Subsection (2) and substituted "Veterinary

Practice Act" for "Veterinarians" in Subsection
(3)(b).
Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch. 100
became effective on May 4, 1998, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
Cross-References. — Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.

58-37c-19.5. Iodine solution greater than 1.5% — Prescription or permit required — Penalties.
(1) As used in this section, "iodine matrix" means iodine at concentrations
greater than 1.5% by weight in a matrix or solution.
(2) A person may offer to sell, sell, or distribute an iodine matrix only:
(a) as a prescription drug, pursuant to a prescription issued by a
veterinarian or physician licensed within the state; or
(b) to a person who is actively engaged in the legal practice of animal
husbandry of livestock, as defined in Section 4-1-8.
(3) Prescriptions issued under this section:
(a) shall provide for a specified number of refills;
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(b) a retail distributor, wholesaler, manufacturer, warehouseman, or
common carrier, or an agent of any of these persons, who possesses
anhydrous ammonia in the regular course of lawful business activities;
(c) directly involved in or actively operating a business or other lawful
activity providing or using anhydrous ammonia for refrigeration applications; or
(d) directly involved in or actively operating a lawful business enterprise, including an industrial enterprise, that uses anhydrous ammonia in
the regular course of its business activities.
History: C. 1953, 58-37c-19.9, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 272, § 4.
Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch 272
became effective on May 1, 2000, pursuant to

Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25
Cross-References. — Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301

58-37c-20. Possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine
— Penalties.
(1) Any person who is not licensed to engage in regulated transactions and
not excepted from licensure who, under circumstances not amounting to a
violation of Subsection 58-37c-3(12)(k) or Subsection 58-37d-4(l)(a), possesses
more than 12 grams of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine, their salts, isomers, or
salts of isomers, or a combination of any of these substances, is guilty of a class
A misdemeanor.
(2) (a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge under Subsection (1) that the
person in possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine, or a combination of
these two substances:
(i) is a physician, pharmacist, retail distributor, wholesaler, manufacturer, warehouseman, or common carrier, or an agent of any of
these persons; and
(ii) possesses the substances in the regular course of lawful business activities.
(b) (i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an
affirmative defense under this section as soon as practicable, but not
later than ten days prior to trial. The court may waive the notice
requirement in the interest of justice for good cause shown, if the
prosecutor is not unfairly prejudiced by the lack of timely notice.
(ii) The notice shall include the specifics of the asserted defense.
(iii) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense by a
preponderance of the evidence. If the defense is established, it is a
complete defense to the charges.
(3) This section does not apply to dietary supplements, herbs, or other
natural products, including concentrates or extracts, which:
(a) are not otherwise prohibited by law; and
(b) may contain naturally occurring ephedrine, ephedrine alkaloids, or
pseudoephedrine, or their salts, isomers, or salts of isomers, or a combination of these substances, that:
(i) are contained in a matrix of organic material; and
(ii) do not exceed 15% of the total weight of the natural product.
History: C. 1953, 58-37c-20, enacted by L.
1998, ch. 100, § 5; 2000, ch. 1, § 98.

Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, substituted "Sub-
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Exhibit F

INSTRUCTION NO.

"Possession" The definition of possession does not require that a person be shown to have
individually possessed a controlled substance precursor. Rather, it is sufficient if it is shown that
the person jointly participated with one or more persons in the possession of a controlled
substance precursor with knowledge that the activity was occurring, or the controlled substance
precursor is found in a place or under circumstances indicating that the person had the ability and
the intent to exercise dominion and control over it.

Exhibit G

INSTRUCTION NO. « ^ P

Before you can convict the defendant, ROBERT CARL TERRY, of CLANDESTINE
LABORATORY PRECURSORS AND/OR EQUIPMENT, as charged in Count One of the
Information, you must find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following
elements of the crime:

1.

That on or about March 21, 2001, at County of Davis, State of Utah;

2.

The defendant, ROBERT CARL TERRY, as a party;

3.

Knowingly or intentionally;
a.

Possessed a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage in a
clandestine laboratory operation;

AND/OR
b.

Conspired with or aided another to engage in a clandestine laboratory
operation; and

4.

In doing so possessed a firearm.

If, after careful consideration of all the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must
find the defendant, ROBERT CARL TERRY, guilty of CLANDESTINE LABORATORY
PRECURSORS AND/OR EQUIPMENT, as charged in Count One of the information.
If, on the other hand, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are
not convinced of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then

you must find the defendant, ROBERT CARL TERRY, not guilty of CLANDESTINE
LABORATORY PRECURSORS AND/OR EQUIPMENT, as charged in Count One of the
Information.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

Before you can convict the defendant, ROBERT CARL TERRY, of CLANDESTINE
LABORATORY PRECURSORS AND/OR EQUIPMENT, as charged in Count Two of the
Information, you must find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following
elements of the crime:

1.

That on or about March 21,2001, at County of Davis, State of Utah;

2.

The defendant, ROBERT CARL TERRY, as a party;

3.

Knowingly or intentionally;
a.

Possessed a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage in a
clandestine laboratory operation;

AND/OR
b.

Conspired with or aided another to engage in a clandestine laboratory
operation; and

4.

In doing so possessed a firearm.

If, after careful consideration of all the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must
find the defendant, ROBERT CARL TERRY, guilty of CLANDESTINE LABORATORY
PRECURSORS AND/OR EQUIPMENT, as charged in Count Two the information.
If, on the other hand, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are
not convinced of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then

you must find the defendant, ROBERT CARL TERRY, not guilty of CLANDESTINE
LABORATORY PRECURSORS AND/OR EQUIPMENT, as charged in Count Two of the
Information.
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